Switching Gears in the Counterinsurgency Fight

The battlefield faced by our Soldiers today can be chaotic, complex and volatile. We are often called upon to operate independently, and we face the challenge of waging a counterinsurgency (COIN) fight that requires the successful and simultaneous accomplishment of two overlapping objectives-to kill the enemy and to win the support of the local population. An ongoing conversation on the CompanyCommand professional forum is focused on how the conduct of COIN operations affects the nature of leadership, and conversely, how leadership, for better or for worse, can impact the COIN fight. As company-level leaders, how do we aggressively kill insurgents yet at the same time win the support of the local population? How do we reconcile the apparent contradiction that is frequently presented by these two objectives? And, how do we help ourselves and our units ramp down emotionally after an intense firefight so that we can interact with the local populace in an effective manner?

This is a timely and relevant issue in the current fight. All Soldiers and junior leaders need training in COIN, to include handling one's emotions when transitioning from the assessment/intelligence collection phase of an operation to making enemy contact and then back again to interacting with people within the immediate area of contact. Listen in as CompanyCommand members share openly about the need to switch gears mentally and emotionally in a COIN environment, and about the importance of training this capability. Company Commander

OIF III

We knew he wasn't going to make it. First Sergeant was there looking at this Soldier as his life was slipping away. That was the first time I've ever felt this intense hatred for all Iraqis. And you have to work through that. The thing that really held me together was I knew my Soldiers were feeling all of the same things. If I'd given the order to destroy every house in that area, they would have done it. The platoon sergeant was bawling. I told him, "You have to hold it together." The thing that gets you through is you are focused on getting everyone else through it. Then when you get back, the world collapses in around you. Like, this has to be a bad dream, but it isn't. You kind of forget a lot of these guys are young kids. These are people you love ... We had a day down and then we were back at it. I talked to my guys, "We are angry but we are professional soldiers. We won't do anything immoral or unethical." You want to deal with that anger, but it would not honor the lives of those men to commit murder in their names.

Jason Pardee

Killer Troop 3/2 ACR

Leaders must understand how to fight a counterinsurgency and get their men to understand it as well. The "kill 'em all" mentality certainly won't help the Army or the United States complete its mission in Iraq or Afghanistan. The ability to understand and get your Soldiers to understand the fact that actions at platoon level can affect things at levels way above the BN, BDE, DIV and even CORPS is key to the COIN fight. Educate yourself on COIN, teach your NCOs and get your NCOs to give classes to your Soldiers.

Michael Eliassen

E Company, 51 st IN (LRS)

What is also important, yet often overlooked, is a cooling off period for Soldiers after an event takes place where you must use force with the enemy. This is important before going right back into a neighborhood when the kids want to play soccer with you. I learned a great lesson over here in 2003 from my old BN CDR; when a vehicle is damaged in an attack, you stay up until it is fixed. That way the psychological impact on the other Soldiers is lessened. It should be the same way with Soldiers who are in a raid or an attack that produces casualties of the friendly, enemy or LN persuasion; you mentally "repair" them so they are not spreading an unwanted emotional charge throughout your unit.

Jonathan Dunn

Killer Troop 3/2 ACR

Killing the insurgents is certainly the 25 meter target, and most tend to equate "winning the hearts and minds" as the 300 meter target. However, it is probably better described as the 25, 50, 100, 200 and 300 meter targets-it is a continuous objective. More to the point, it is the more important objective, because it is what will ultimately bring success. Contrary to what many junior soldiers think, it can actually enhance our ability to kill insurgents through the increased cooperation of the local population, their indifferent neutrality, or at a minimum, less active opposition towards us. I think a lot of it comes down to basic leadership, in that you must set the example and know your subordinates. You should be able to know which soldiers are more apt to be weaker at emotional control, based on off-hand comments, prior engagements and actions, etc. First and foremost, we need to provide tough, realistic training with scenarios that replicate going from "hot" (high intensity) scenarios to "cold" ones. This can and is currently being done at the combat training centers (JRTC, NTC, CMTC) right now as they prepare units for deployment. This addresses the tactical problem and can be trained extensively, both at home station and at the CTCs. However, it only addresses half of the problem, and quite bluntly, the easier half of the problem. The more difficult aspect, and also much more difficult to train, is the emotional side. At the end of the day, one's ability to "wear two faces" is dependent on the ability to control one's emotions. We can never truly replicate one's battle buddy being wounded or killed, nor of course would we want to. However, we need to be able to throw "emotional challenges" at ourselves and our soldiers. Here, the limit is truly our own imagination.