South African plaintiffs are suing numerous multinational corporations under the American Alien Tort Claims Act for aiding and abetting apartheid's crimes against humanity. This article argues that Re South African Apartheid Litigation should be understood as a cosmopolitan re-membering of the nation. This interpretation runs counter to theoretical and political presumptions of an inherent antagonism between cosmopolitanism and nationhood. The apparent divide between cosmopolitanism and nation-building is bridged by the concept of victimhood. Insofar as nation-building in South Africa depends upon the restoration of victims, so too is cosmopolitanism victim-centered in its commitment to prevent harm and suffering. The apartheid litigants enact the duality of cosmopolitanism: they press for justice on the basis of cosmopolitan right, yet they do so in part because of their continued marginalization in the "new" South Africa with respect to issues of "truth" and reparation. Following on the "unfinished business" of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the apartheid litigation illustrates the intersection of cosmopolitanism with national memory and belonging.

In an action that seeks "justice without borders," South African plaintiffs have filed suit in the United States against numerous multinational corporations for aiding and abetting apartheid's crimes against humanity. The plaintiffs rely upon the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which grants universal jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States" (28 U.S.C. sec. 1350 [1789]). The South African government has steadfastly opposed the litigation on the grounds of national sovereignty and, in particular, that foreign courts "bear no responsibility for the well-being of our country and ... our constitution[al] ... promotion of national reconciliation" (Mbeki 2003: n.p.). Although nation-building in postconflict societies arguably might take place only within the nation, this also provokes the question, "what is a nation?" in an era of economic globalization, legal and moral cosmopolitanism, and transnational violence and injustice. The politics surrounding Re South African Apartheid Litigation (2004) bring this question to the forefront of a long-standing debate between cosmopolitanism and nationhood, which typically presumes an inherent conflict between the two. Contemporary cosmopolitanisms, theorized under the cluster of phenomena known as globalization, draw upon ancient Stoic ideals of world citizenship and Kantian principles of cosmopolitan or universal right. Cosmopolitanism in general upholds the moral dignity and equality of all human beings as individuals, regardless of their culture, nationality, or citizenship. Cosmopolitanism rejects ethnonationalism or unreflective patriotism and urges engagement with the world. It speaks of moral obligations beyond borders and of enforcing minimal standards of decency within borders.

This runs counter to the statist view of international relations. According to the statist view, nation-states are the ultimate source of legal or moral authority, and their integrity is guaranteed by principles of nonintervention and national self-determination (see Fine 2003:452-3). These two principles must be respected for the sake of international peace and because they protect different ways of life amongst nations.1 Nationalists argue that the nation provides the best context in which trust, reciprocity, right, obligation, and political self-determination can take place (see Tan 2002:435-9). This is because co-nationals have historic, political, and territorial ties; shared values and loyalties; and a common identity. A citizen of the world, in contrast, is in fact a citizen of nowhere (see Bowden 2003). Solidarity in the name of general humanity is too abstract to be meaningful. And, critics further charge, the promotion of cosmopolitan universality is inevitably the imposition of somebody else's values.

The principles of nonintervention and national self-determination are both evident in the South African government's opposition to the apartheid litigation. First, in accordance with the statist view of international relations, the South African government objects to the intervention of a foreign court in its supposedly sovereign affairs. On this view, international law ought to recognize only states as legal subjects, whereas cosmopolitan law also recognizes individuals and groups in civil society as legal persons (see Fine 2003:452-3). The ATCA decenters the state. It permits extraterritorial legal action for human rights crimes, and it recognizes individuals and multinational corporations as legal subjects. Moreover, the South African government sees the ATCA as threatening to override domestic constitutional law. This concern leads to the second principle of objection, which is the focus of this article: the fear that external interference will jeopardize South Africa's chosen path toward national unity and reconciliation. Through democratic and constitutional means, South Africa established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and other policies to deal with its apartheid past. The "new" South Africa, so the argument goes, is based on values of reconciliation, reconstruction, and goodwill-and not on the antagonistic, alienating, and retributive values of litigation.